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ON THE WATERFRONT AT THE PIER'S EDGE:
THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT*
George P. Smith, Il t
The law relating to longshoremen's remedies abounds with
surprising anomalies, hyper-technical distinctions, and bits and
pieces of judicial legislation. This situation stems largely from de-
ficiencies in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act of 1927, an inherently inadequate statute greatly distorted
by recent judicial interpretation.'
A number of vexatious problems arise when one injured in the
course of maritime activity attempts to invoke the compensatory device
of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.2 In
many instances the difference of a few feet may mark the dividing line
between the realistic recovery afforded by the Act and the rudimentary
protection provided by various state compensation statutes.3 Yet relief
has not been forthcoming; the nation's 100,000 longshoremen and
harbor workers4 continue to be the victims of two pernicious forms of
neglect-judicial irresponsibility and legislative passivity.
* The author expresses his appreciation to Professor Wylie H. Davis for his valuable
suggestions and criticism in the preparation of this article. The author also acknowledges
the research assistance of Richard Beard, a student at the University of Arkansas Law
School.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. B.S. 1961, J.D. 1964, Indiana
University.
I Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927:
Half-Way Protection for the Stevedore and the Longshoreman, 64 Mxcu. L. REv. 1553
(1965) (footnote omitted).
2 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
3 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1301 to -1349 (1947); CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3201-6002
(West 1955); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 440.01-.58 (1966); Ia.. ANN. STAT., ch. 48, §§ 138.1-.28
(Smith-Hurd 1969); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:1021-:1351 (1964); N.Y. Woa.s-xN's CoMP.
Liw §§ 1-328 (McKinney 1965). See generally R. LEFIAR, AasRm=cA CoNFLiers LAw 389-408
(1968).
The recovery afforded under the Longshoremen's Act is generally more liberal than
that provided by the various state workmen's compensation statutes. Significant differences
exist as to the amount of benefits payable and the period of disability during which
benefits are recoverable. Thus, "picayune fact distinctions can determine whether the
same injury is worth fifty-four dollars per month throughout the entire period of dis-
ability or only thirty dollars monthly for a maximum of three hundred weeks . Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 1563.
For a comparison of the provisions of the Louisiana and federal statutes, see 36
TUL. L. R1xv. 134, 137 n.16 (1961).
4 Telephone conversation with Mr. Lawrence Molloy, Public Relations Counsel for
the International Longshoremen's Association, New York City, Feb. 13, 1970.
LONGSHOREMEN'S COMPENSATION
I
BACKGROUND: THlE NEED FOR FEDERAL COMPENSATION
The genesis of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act is traceable to the efforts of states in the early part of the
twentieth century to apply their own compensation acts to workers
injured in the course of maritime employment. Under these acts, the
worker who was land-based and who sustained an injury arising out of
his employment while on land was afforded a legal remedy against his
employer. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, found it
difficult to apply the laws to an employee injured while on a ship or
other object lying in navigable waters or while in the very waters them-
selves.5
The landmark decision that pointed up the need for appropriate
federal legislation in the area of maritime workers' compensation was
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen." Christen Jensen was a stevedore em-
ployed by Southern Pacific to unload lumber from its ship by using an
electric truck. Jensen stood on the rear of the truck and drove it over
a gangway leading from the pier into the ship's hold. On one such trip,
while leaving the ship with a load of lumber, the load became jammed
against the gangway. When Jensen reversed the direction of the truck,
his head struck the top of the cargo hold opening and was thrown
forward against the lumber, causing his death.
Jensen's beneficiaries collected compensation under New York's
workmen's compensation law, which at the time specifically covered
longshore work on waters within New York's territorial limits. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the award by a five-to-four deci-
sion and held the New York law unconstitutional as applied to an
individual injured aboard a vessel on navigable waters. 7 Justice McRey-
nolds, writing for the majority, stressed the desirability of uniform
admiralty rules within the states, noting that uniformity would be
jeopardized by state legislative acts similar to New York's.8 He observed
that the deceased was engaged in maritime activities under a maritime
contract and that his rights and liabilities were within the admiralty
jurisdiction.9 What disturbed the Court most was New York's require-
ment that all ships loading or unloading in her ports secure a type of
5 See generally H. BaR, ADMIRA.TY LW OF THE SuPREME COURT 112-91 (2d ed. 1969);
D. IOERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 148-221 (1970).
6 244 U.S. 205 (1916).
7 Id. at 217-18.
8 Id. at 215-16.
9 Id. at 215, 217.
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compensation insurance.10 The majority believed that this requirement
would destroy the uniformity in maritime matters established by the
Constitution and that freedom of navigation between the states "would
be seriously hampered and impeded.""'
Jensen formulated a "converse Erie" thesis which held that the
state courts must follow substantive federal law in all maritime cases.12
As a consequence of Jensen, injuries that occurred on shore were recog-
nized as being within the reach of state compensation acts, but injuries
that occurred on water were exclusively within the federal domain.
Harsh results were inevitable since there was then no federal compensa-
tion act.18
10 Id. at 217.
11 Id. Justice McReynolds commented further that it was difficult, if indeed not im-
possible
to define with exactness just how far the general maritime law may be changed,
modified, or affected by state legislation.... [N]o such legislation is valid if it ...
works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime
law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations.
Id. at 216. It appears that Justice McReynolds relied heavily on a false interpretation of
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874), for his position on maritime uniformity.
See Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty over Common Law, 21
COLUM. L. Ray. 647 (1921).
Jensen's rights and those of his survivors were to be recognized in admiralty or in
common law courts, but not under state workmen's compensation acts. Justice Holmes,
in his dissent, observed: "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky
but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified ....
It always is the law of some State ...." 244 U.S. at 222.
Justice Pitney, in a lengthy dissent, conceded
the authority of Congress to modify the rules of maritime law so far as they
are administered in the federal courts, and to. make them binding upon the courts
of the states so far as they affect interstate or international relations, or regulate
"commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes."
Id. at 250-51. He nonetheless strongly asserted that "the Constitution does not, pro prio
vigore, impose the maritime law upon the States except to the extent that the admiralty
jurisdiction was exclusive of the courts of common law before the Constitution . Id.
at 251. Pitney continued by stating what he believed to be
a curious inconsistency to hold . . . that the rules of the maritime law exclude
the operation of a state statute without action by Congress, although the Consti-
tution contains no express grant of authority to establish rules of maritime law,
and the authority must be implied from the mere constitutional grant of judicial
power over the subject ....
Id. at 252. He found it remarkable that "this result is reached in the face of the fact
that the judicial power in cases of admiralty jurisdiction has been put into effect by
Congress subject to an express reservation of the previous concurrent jurisdiction of the
courts of law over actions of this character." Id.
12 Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. Rav. 1, 33-34 (1963).
Is Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1917), made.even clearer the obli-
gation of state courts to apply federal maritime law.
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Following Jensen, Congress began to take an interest in the prob-
lems of maritime workers injured upon navigable waters. It first sought
to remedy the problem by adding to the Judiciary Act's "saving to
suitors" clause 14 the phrase, "to claimants the rights and remedies un-
der the workmen's compensation law of any State."' 5 The intent of
this amendment was to provide coverage to injured maritime workers
under the various state compensation acts. This attempt by Congress
to delegate its powers to the states was, however, short-lived and soon
upset by Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart. 6 By another five-to-four
decision, the Supreme Court reversed an award given to a maritime
employee under the New York State compensation law. Justice McRey-
nolds declared the 1917 amendment to the Judiciary Act unconstitu-
tional:
[W]e think the enactment is beyond the power of Congress. Its
power to legislate concerning rights and liabilities within the mari-
time jurisdiction and remedies for their enforcement, arises from
the Constitution. . . .The definite object of the grant was to
commit direct control to the Federal Government; to relieve
maritime commerce from unnecessary burdens and disadvantages
incident to discordant legislation; and to establish, so far as prac-
ticable, harmonious and uniform rules applicable throughout
every part of the Union.' 7
Its spirits undaunted, and its responsibility to enact comprehensive
legislation unmet, in 1922 Congress amended the "saving to suitors"
clause of the Judiciary Act to exclude "the master or members of the
crew of a vessel" from those entitled to "rights and remedies under the
workmen's compensation law of any State."' 8 Two years later, in Wash-
ington v. W.C. Dawson & Co.,'9 Justice McReynolds held this amend-
ment unconstitutional, but in so doing charted a path for Congress to
take in the future:
14 Judidary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (corresponds to present 28 U..C.
§ 1331(1) (1964)). This section conferred upon the federal district courts exclusive original
congnizance "of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." It left concurrent
jurisdiction over common law actions in maritime cases in state courts by "saving to
suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is com-
petent to give it."
1 Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395 (repealed 1948).
18 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
17 Id. at 164.
18 Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634 (repealed 1948), which saved "to
claimants for compensation for injuries to or death of persons other than the master or
members of the crew of a vessel their rights and remedies under the workmen's compen-
sation law of any State... :'
19 264 US. 219 (1924).
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Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise
the maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its
will and judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment
of a general employers' liability law or general provisions for com-
pensating injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the
several States. The grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
looks to uniformity; otherwise wide discretion is left to Congress.20
Despite this series of opinions, it should be noted that the Court
itself sought to correct the harsh results of Jensen by applying the
"local concern" doctrine.21 In Grant-Smith Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde,22
where a carpenter sustained injuries while working on a vessel that was
on navigable waters, the Oregon compensation statute was allowed to
transcend Jensen's jurisdictional line. Under Rohde, it was held that
regardless of the situs of the injury, if the work being performed was
of "local concern," the appropriate state compensation act could be
applied. Clearly, then, before 1927 and the passage of the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Act, an employee injured on shore was
protected by the applicable state compensation act, but an employee
injured on navigable water had no statutory remedy for compensation
unless he was engaged in work of local concern.
II
THE ACT AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Following Justice McReynold's suggestion in Dawson, Congress
enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act2 3
in 1927. The Act was designed to cover any maritime employee killed
or injured in an accident that occurred upon navigable waters. 24
20 Id. at 227.
21 For a discussion of this doctrine, see Comment, The Tangled Seine: A Survey of
Maritime Personal Injury Remedies, 57 YALE L.J. 243, 270-71 (1947).
22 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
23 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
24 Section 3 of the Act, entitled "Coverage," reads:
(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability
or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock)
and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation
proceedings may not validly be provided by State law. No compensation shall
be payable in respect of the disability or death of-
(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged
by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen
tons net; or
(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof
or of any State or foreign government, or of any political subdivision thereof.
(b) No compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned solely
[Vol. 56:114
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The Act's requirement that the accident occur upon navigable
waters is a distinction that can play havoc with claims arising on the
wrong end of a three-foot gangplank. An examination of the legislative
history of the Act reveals why the courts are confused by its jurisdic-
tional requirement. One statement from a Senate report issued just
prior to passage of the Act declared:
The purpose of this bill is to provide ... compensation, in the
stead of liability, for a class of employees commonly known as
"longshoremen." These men are mainly employed in loading, un-
loading, refitting, and repairing ships; but it should be remarked
that injuries occurring in loading or unloading are not covered
unless they occur on the ship or between the wharf and the ship
so as to bring them within the maritime jurisdiction of the United
States.25
It would appear from this language that Congress desired to provide
coverage on a situs rather than a status basis. There is other language,
however, in the legislative history which suggests that at least one
group-the International Longshoremen's Association-anticipated
coverage that was status-oriented. The following exchange between the
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee and the International Long-
shoremen's Association representative illustrates this point:
The CHAnwAN. As you understand this bill it would give an
employee compensation even if he were injured on the dock.
Mr. DEMPSEY. Yes, sir; it will also give compensation to a
man on board ship.
The CHxmmAN. If he is at work in maritime employment?
Mr. DEMPSEY. Yes, sir; if he is working in maritime employ-
ment it is the same whether on the docks or on board ship, because
the cargo has to be assembled on the dock and handled there in
order to go on board ship. . . .They handle the- cargo all the
time, going and coming from the deck. There is no difference in
the nature of the employment but only in the position they are in
when an injury may occur....26
After passage in the Senate, the bill was sent to the House where
it was amended to its present form. The ambiguous language was not
corrected, and it is therefore questionable whether Congress knew
exactly what it was passing. Only a few days before passage, Congress-
by the intoxication of the employee or by the willful intention of the employee
to injure or kill himself or another.
Id. § 903 (1964).
25 S. RE. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1926).
26 Hearings on S. 3170 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary,
69th Cong., 1st Sen. 26-27 (1926).
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man LaGuardia made this statement concerning its anticipated cover-
age:
Mr. Speaker, it is quite possible to explain the purpose and
the necessity of this bill in two minutes.... Owing to our dual
form of government we find that longshoremen are employed by
companies or individuals engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce, and therefore there is some question whether or not a State
law could be made applicable to them. In order to meet that situa-
tion it is necessary to pass a Federal law. This is what they are
doing now. This law simply gives the longshoremen the benefit of
up-to-date legislation to cover injuries sustained in the course of
their employment. That is all there is to it.27
These paradigms of the legislative history of the Act show it to be
grounded in confusion. As the above passages illustrate there is language
to support either a situs- or status-oriented position. Unfortunately,
the courts have reacted with pendulous enthusiasm to the task of as-
certaining the precise intent of Congress.
III
JUDICLAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACT
The reason for the courts structuring a "local concern" doctrine
seemingly ended with the passage of the Longshoremen's Act. Yet the
doctrine was continually applied.2 The basic effect of its continued
application was that an employee injured on navigable water while
engaged in work of "local concern" could not proceed under the Act,
but was restricted to recovery under state law. The irony of this de-
velopment is apparent-recovery under the Federal Act was usually
more liberal than that afforded under state legislation. Thus, while
the "local concern" doctrine was initially structured to provide a rem-
edy for employees who sustained injuries on navigable waters in the
course of employment, it eventually became a defense against their
claims for federal compensation."
This interpretation of the Act continued until 1942 and the in-
ception of the "twilight zone" doctrine, which was formulated to
alleviate the myriad problems created by the extensive application of
27 68 CONG. REC. 5414 (1927).
28 Carlin Constr. Co. v. Heaney, 299 U.S. 41 (1936); Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. v.
Department of Labor, 277 U.S. 135 (1928); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 276 US. 467 (1928).
29 See Gainsburgh & Fallon, Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Company: The Twi-
light's Last Gleaming?, 87 TuL. L. REv. 79, 82-83 (1962).
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the "local concern" doctrine. In Davis v. Department of Labor,30 a
structural steel worker engaged in dismantling a bridge across a nav-
igable river fell into the river and was drowned. The Court, speaking
through Justice Black, allowed the dependent's request for relief under
the state compensation act, noting that persons such as the deceased
occupied "that shadowy area within which, at some undefined and un-
definable point, state laws can validly provide compensation." '81 Justice
Black stated that there existed a "twilight zone" where the decision on
which compensation act to apply had to be determined on a case-by-
case basis.32 This doctrine was quickly seized by the courts in an effort
to effect a balance between federal and state interests, and the resultant
expansion of state jurisdiction was consistently affirmed.33
It is important to contrast Davis with Parker v. Motor Boat Sales,
Inc.,34 the first case to squarely decide the extent to which Congress
had actually exercised its power in passing the Longshoremen's Act. In
Parker, a janitor employed exclusively on shore went on a test run of
an outboard motor on the James River and was drowned when the
boat capsized. Due to a technicality, Virginia's compensation statute
was unavailable to the widow. Proceeding, however, under the Long-
shoremen's Act, she obtained an award. The Fourth Circuit set the
award aside by adhering to the statutory interpretation that Congress
had occupied only the area excluded from state protection.8 5
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and reinstated the
award of the lower court. Justice Black concluded that, although the
extent of federal jurisdiction was unclear, the existence of state com-
80 317 US. 249 (1942).
31 Id. at 253.
82 Id. at 256. Justice Black observed:
There is . . . dearly a twilight zone in which the employees must have their
rights determined case by case, and in which particular facts and circumstances
are vital elements ....
Faced with this factual problem, we must give great-indeed, presumptive-
weight to the conclusions of the appropriate federal authorities and to the
state statutes themselves. Where there has been a hearing by the federal ad-
ministrative agency entrusted with broad powers of investigation, fact finding,
determination, and award, our task proves easy ....
In the instant case we do not enjoy the benefit of federal administrative
findings and must therefore look solely to state sources for guidance.. .. [Here
we rely] heavily on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the state
statute.
Id. at 256-57.
33 E.g., Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959); Avondale Marine
Ways v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953); see Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for Mari-
time Employees: Obscurity in the Twilight Zone, 68 HARv. L. Rv. 637 (1955).
84 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
85 Motor Boat Sales, Inc. v. Parker, 116 F.2d 789 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
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pensation did not limit the operation of the federal statute.8 6 The Court
expressly held that Congress had exercised its power so that the facts
of Parker were within the coverage of the Act: "While the proviso of
§ 3(a) appears to be a subtraction from . . . the Act ... outlined by
Congress... it is not a large enough subtraction to place this case out-
side the coverage which Congress intended to provide."87
In 1962, in an effort to penetrate the quagmire created by Parker
and Davis, the Court decided Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.,38
which according to one writer ended the "twilight zone" doctrine. 9 In
Calbeck, injuries were sustained by employees working on new vessels
under construction and afloat upon navigable waters. 40 The Fifth Cir-
cuit denied recovery 1 on the grounds that state compensation could
validly apply to those working on uncompleted vessels42 and that a per-
son injured while working on such a vessel was neither in the "twilight
zone" nor entitled to elect recovery under state or federal law.43
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and allowed re-
covery, deciding that "the Longshoremen's Act was designed to ensure
that a compensation remedy existed for all injuries sustained by em-
ployees on navigable waters, and to avoid uncertainty as to the source,
state or federal, of that remedy."44 Speaking for the majority, Justice
Brennan stated that "Congress invoked its constitutional power so as
to provide compensation for all injuries sustained by employees on nav-
igable waters whether or not a particular injury might also have been
within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation
law."45 In Calbeck, then, the Court explicitly recognized the concur-
rent jurisdiction of the Longshoremen's Act and state acts for injuries
sustained on navigable waters. The notable exception is for those cases
86 314 U.S. at 248.
37 Id. at 249.
88 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
89 Huttenbrauck, Maritime Personal Injury Cases-The Twilight Zone, 32 INs.
COUNSEL J. 92, 96 (1965).
40 This case was decided together with Donovan v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 370
U s. 114 (1962).
41 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 370 US. 114 (1962).
42 293 F.2d at 57.
43 Id. at 59.
44 370 US. at 124.
45 Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan, vigorously dissented on the ground that
the Court totally disregarded the dear words of the Act: "[T'he Court concludes that
Congress did not really mean what it said. I cannot join in this exercise in judicial
legerdemain.. .. While the result reached today may be a desirable one, it is simply
not what the law provides." Id. at 132.
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where the maritime uniformity doctrine of Jensen makes questionable
the availability of a state remedy. In effect, Calbeck returns us to the
jurisdictional line originally drawn by Jensen-the water's edge.46
Courts have had no difficulty applying the Longshoremen's Act to
injuries received in dry docks, since dry dock injuries are specifically
covered by the Act.47 This particular portion of the Act brings into
sharp focus the glaring anomalies that exist and are nurtured by court
decisions. Although courts are ever zealous in their efforts to restrict
the Longshoremen's Act to injuries occurring upon navigable waters,
the existence of the phrase "including any dry dock"48 has extended
coverage to persons working great distances from the water line.49
Two early decisions indicate the courts' propensity to liberally
construe the Act with regard to dry docks. In Travelers Insurance Co.
v. Branham,50 the decedent was killed when he slipped from a floating
barge that was inside a dry dock then under construction. Although the
dry dock was only five percent completed at the time of the accident,
the court held that the Act, as a remedial statute, should be liberally
construed 51 and allowed recovery.
The decedent in Travelers Insurance Co. v. McManiga52 was
killed, oddly enough, while working on the same dry dock as was the
decedent in Branham. In this case, however, sixty-two percent of the
dry dock had been completed and the water had been pumped out of
the interior where the decedent was working at the time of the acci-
dent. Travelers argued that the accident did not occur upon navigable
waters or a dry dock53 and, therefore, the decedent was not covered by
the Longshoremen's Act. The court held that the decedent was con-
46 Id. at 126.
47 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964).
48 Id.
49 Three basic types of dry docks are considered in O'Leary v. Puget Sound Bridge
9- Dry Dock Co., 349 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1965). As described by the Department of the
Navy, Bureau of Yards and Docks, these three principal types of dry-docking facilities are:
(1) a "floating dry dock"--one that may be partially submerged to allow entrance of a
vessel (after docking, water is pumped out of the ballast tanks until the dock is clear
of water); (2) a "graving dock"--a permanently fixed basin into which a ship is floated
(the water is then pumped out, exposing the underwater portion of the hull); and (3)
a "marine railway"--a permanently fixed track system that extends from well above the
waterline to an offshore point well below the waterline (a cradle that ships float onto
is employed to pull them free of the water). Id. at 573.
50 136 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1948).
51 Id. at 875.
52 139 F.2d 949 (4th Cir. 1944).
53 Id. at 950.
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structively standing in navigable waters at the time of his injury and
allowed recovery.54
Similarly, courts have applied the Act to injuries sustained by em-
ployees working on a marine railway. Possibly the most liberal con-
struction was made in Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson,55
when the Fifth Circuit allowed recovery by the dependents of two em-
ployees killed in an explosion on a barge that was some 400 feet from
water. Again, in Holland v. Harrison Brothers Dry Dock & Repair
Yard, Inc.,r6 the court granted federal compensation to a shipyard em-
ployee injured while working on a barge on a marine railway. The
court said that although the employee had both feet on dry land, he
was within the "twilight zone" and was properly entitled to relief under
the Longshoremen's Act.57
The most troublesome situation confronting the courts is that of
a longshoreman injured on the dock while employed in loading, un-
loading, or supervising a vessel lying in navigable waters, when his
injuries are the direct and proximate cause of his employment. In
Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc.,58 a longshoreman working on a pier
to load a ship lying alongside was struck and injured by a life raft that
fell from the vessel. The Court denied any relief, commenting that
even though the petitioner sought relief under the Jones Act, his claim
would also have been dismissed if it had been brought under the Long-
shoremen's Act, "since [that] Act is restricted to compensation for in-
juries occurring on navigable waters, [and thus] excludes from its own
terms and from the Jones Act any remedies against the employer for
injuries inflicted on shore."'59
In 1948, Congress enacted the Admiralty Extension Act60 which
altered somewhat the historical test and became the justification for a
more liberal situs requirement. In Interlake Steamship Co. v. Niel-
sen,61 a shipkeeper who had driven his car off a dock and into Lake Erie
54 Id. at 952.
55 201 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1953).
56 306 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1962).
57 Id. at 370.
58 328 U.S. 1 (1946). Recovery in Swanson was sought under § 33 of the Jones Act,
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
59 328 U.S. at 7.
60 The Act provides in part:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to
and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a
vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done
or consummated on land.
46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
61 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964).
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while inspecting a moored vessel was deemed to have been covered by
the Longshoremen's Act. The court, relying on the Extension Act and
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.,62 concluded that the trend pointed
in the direction of expanding the boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction
toward land.63 However, the Nielsen court's reliance upon the Exten-
sion Act was misplaced; by its very language, the Extension Act is ap-
plicable only to cases in which a vessel has caused damage.64
More directly within the intended coverage of the Admiralty Ex-
tension Act is Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien. 5 There, a
stevedore was working on a "skid"-a removable wooden platform ex-
tending over the water between the vessel and the wharf-when hit
and injured by a barrel that fell from the ship he was helping to un-
load. The insurance company contended that the skid was an extension
of land and therefore outside the reach of the Longshoremen's Act. Nev-
ertheless, the court concluded that the Longshoremen's Act was "in-
tended to cover injuries incurred ... over navigable waters-such as
skids or gangplanks." 6 The court continued by observing that a tem-
porary skid should not be analogized to a wharf because once a wharf
is completed, the water underneath it is permanently removed from
navigation. In contrast, a skid or a gangplank is no more permanent
than a ship moored in the same place would be.6 7 Additionally, the con-
cession that there was sufficient connection with the land to sustain an
award under the state compensation law was held not to preclude, the
federal remedy.68
IV
Nacirema-PIHE ONE
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson69 was decided by the Supreme
Court in 1969. With it, the conflict over coverage of dock and pier
accidents under the Longshoremen's Act still remains unresolved. A-
consideration of the court of appeals decision is crucial to a complete
understanding and placement of this case in its proper perspective.
Nacirema arose from district court actions with similar fact situa-
62 870 U.S. 114 (1962).
63 338 F.2d at 882.
64 Note 60 supra.
65 344 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1965).
66 Id. at 643.
67 Id. at 644.
68 Id. at 645.
69 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
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tions. In Johnson v. Traynor,70 two longshoremen, Johnson and Klo-
sek, employed as "slingers" or "hook.on men," were stationed 0n a pier
in a gondola car containing steel beams. They were hooking the drafts
of the beams onto a ship's crane which in turn lowered the drafts into
the vessel's hold. One draft swung back from the hold and struck the
men. Klosek was thrown from the gondola car onto the pier and died.
Johnson was pinned against the side of the car and sustained disabling
injuries. The deputy commissioner rejected both claims under the
Longshoremen's Act and the district court affirmed, relying on the
traditional view that the dock is an extension of land and injuries sus-
tained thereupon are compensable solely under a state workmen's
compersation act. In a second action, East v. Oosting,71 a district court
similarly affirmed a denial of recovery by 4 longshoreman, Avery, who
also sustained injuries while working as a "slinger" on a pier. Finally,
in Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting,72 another longshoreman, Vann,
in a separate incident, was killed when a cable he was working with
suddenly straightened, throwing him off the pier into the Elizabeth
River, where he drowned. The deputy commissioner awarded death
benefits and the district court affirmed.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit"8 affirmed the recovery in Marine
Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting and reversed the denial of recovery in
Johnson v. Traynor and East v. Oosting.74 In a thoughtful opinion,
Judge Sobeloff first examined the legislative history of the Act, cited
excerpts from it, and concluded:
While the definitive answer is not forthcoming from either the Act
itself or its history, we find substantial support for the conclusion
that Congress designed the Act to be status oriented, reaching all
injuries sustained by longshoremen in the course of their employ-
ment35
Judge SQbeloff noted ,further that, according to past Supreme Qourt
decisions, the Act "'must be liberally construed in conformance with
70 g43 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965), rev'd sub noma. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v.
osting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub noam. Nacirema Operating Co. Y, Jobnson,
390 U.S. 21- (1909).
73. 245 F. Supp. 51 (ED., Vat 1965), rev'd sub nom. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting,
398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub noma. Nadrema Operating Qo. v. Jqhn.qn, 896 U.S.
212 (1969).
72 288 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965), aff'd, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 198).
73 Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968). rev'd sus nom.
Nacirema operating Co. v. Johnson, 896 U.S. 212 (1969).
74 Chief Judge Haynsworth, joined by Judge Boreman, vigorously disaeqlted from
the reversal of Johnson v. Traynor and East v. Oosting. 898 F.2d at 909.
75 Id. at 904 (footnote omitted).
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its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous re-
sults.' -76 The majority felt no compulsion to base a decision on the
"twilight zone" doctrine or to rely on the Admiralty Extension Act.
Rather, they chose to rely on the idea that the Act itself had been de-
signed to cover longshoremen injured in the course of their maritime
employment. The court was emphatic in pointing out that all of the
injured men had been members of a "gang" of twenty men, all of
whom did approximately the same work and faced the same risks.
Those men who worked on the vessel were undoubtedly covered by
the Act, and the court concluded that "[i]t would be intolerably harsh
and incongruous to deny the same benefits to a longshoreman injured
while performing the same task on an adjoining pier."77
Chief Judge Haynsworth's dissent expressed a desire to eliminate
the incongruities of the present status of dock-side injuries.78 However,
in a very pragmatic argument, he concluded that the main objective
of the Act was to provide the benefits of some sort of compensation
system to longshoremen while working aboard ship. 9 Because the Su-
preme Court had struck down attempts to extend state compensation
actions, Congress was forced to provide the needed protection.8 0 In
order to prevent any overlap, Congress limited federal coverage to the
seaward side of the dock and allowed state compensation to provide
the remedy on the landward side.8' Most important, in the Chief
Judge's opinion, was that the longshoreman "is never without the pro-
tection of one statute or the other."8 2
V
Nacirema-PHASE Two
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and
once again placed the line of demarcation for recovering compensation
76 Id. at 906-07, quoting Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953).
77 398 F.2d at 907.
78 Id. at 909, 911.
79 Id. at 909-10,
80 Id. at 910.
81 Id. at 910-11.
82 Id. at 911.
The Chief Judge concluded that while "the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v.
Department of Labor and Industries.. . served the very practical purpose of eliminating
confusion within the twilight zone . . ," the court here was taking "the other road
to spread confusion where none existed before and to sow vast thickets of controversy
and litigation which no system of workmen's compensation can afford." Id. at 914.
/, .
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under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act at the pier's
edge.83
While conceding that the Act employed language that appeared
to provide coverage according to the situs of the injury, respondents
nonetheless maintained that the Act had a much broader coverage: the
status of the longshoremen employed in performing a maritime con-
tract.84 Justice White, speaking for the majority, determined that
Congress had restricted the scope of the coverage to the situs of the
injury alone.85 Reviewing Jensen and the abortive efforts by Congress
to legislate in the area in 1917 and 1922,86 and noting that the hearings
prior to Act's passage demonstrated that, as to section 3 of the Act, "a
place within the admiralty jurisdiction" did not include a dock or
pier, 7 Justice White concluded that Congress did not extend coverage
to the respondents who sustained injuries on the landward side of the
Jensen line, since they were dearly entitled to protection under state
compensation acts. 88
Noting that although in previous decisions the Supreme Court
had allowed recovery under state law when the injury sustained was
seaward of the pier, and under the Longshoremen's Act when the
injury might also have been compensable under state law, Justice
White explained that "removing uncertainties as to the Act's coverage
of injuries occurring on navigable waters is a far cry from construing
the Act to reach injuries on land traditionally within the ambit of state
compensation actions." 89 He continued:
Indeed, Calbeck freely cited the Parker and Davis declarations
that the Longshoremen's Act adopted the Jensen line, and Cal-
beck's holding rejected the notion that the line should advance or
recede simply because decisions of this Court had permitted state
remedies in narrow areas seaward of that line. Otherwise, the reach
of the federal Act would be subject to uncertainty, and its coverage
would "expand and recede in harness with developments in con-
stitutional interpretation as to the scope of state power to com-
pensate injuries on navigable waters," with the result "that every
litigation raising an issue of federal coverage would raise an issue
of constitutional dimension, with all that implies .... .... As in
Calbeck, we refuse to impute to Congress the intent of burdening
83 Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969). This decision involved
only the claims of Klosek, Johnson, and Avery.
84 Id. at 215.
85 Id. at 215-16.
86 Id. at 216; notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra.
87 396 U.S. at 217; see notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra.
88 396 U.S. 219-20.
89 Id. at 221.
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the administration of compensation by perpetuating such confu-
sion.90
The Admiralty Extension Act was also held inapplicable to the
facts of the case.91 Although cognizant that the Act extended admiralty
tort jurisdiction to injuries on piers, the Court stated that such injuries
could be classified as maritime torts only when caused by a vessel on
navigable waters. It found no evidence that Congress had intended the
Extension Act to affect the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act.92 In
refusing to judicially legislate here, the majority concluded with a call
for congressional action reminiscent of Washington v. W.C. Dawson
& Co.:93
There is much to be said for uniform treatment of longshore-
men injured while loading or unloading a ship. But even con-
struing the Extension Act to amend the Longshoremen's Act
would not effect this result, since longshoremen injured on a pier
by pier-based equipment would still remain outside the Act. And
construing the Longshoremen's Act to coincide with the limits of
admiralty jurisdiction-whatever they may be and however they
may change-simply replaces one line with another whose uncer-
tain contours can only perpetuate on the landward side of the
Jensen line, the same confusion which previously existed on the
seaward side. While we have no doubt that Congress had the power
to choose either of these paths in defining the coverage of its com-
pensation remedy, the plain fact is that it chose instead the line in
Jensen separating water from land at the edge of the pier. The
invitation to move that line landward must be addressed to Con-
gress, not to this Court.94
CONCLUSION
While Calbeck might be thought of as showing a clear preference
for an interest-balancing approach in this area, even a cursory reading
of Nacirema forces the inescapable conclusion that the dogmatism of
90 Id., quoting Calbeck Y, Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 126 (1962).
91 396 US. at 221-22.
92 Id. at 222.
93 Text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
94 396 U.S. at 223-24.
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Brennan, argued in a succinct but
cogent dissent that, as Judge Sobeloff had noted previously, the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is status-oriented and reaches "'all injuries sustained
by longshoremen in the course of their employment.'" Id. at 224, quoting Marine Steve-
doring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900, 904 (4th Cir. 1968). Justice Douglas stated that
the phrase, "upon navigable waters," should be equated with "admiralty jurisdiction."
396 U.S. at 225.
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the past is with us again. A uniform system of compensation is now the
rule on the seaward side of the pier's edge. On the landward side, the
facts of each case and the peculiarities of local law are the rule. Judicial
history appears, as viewed in a looking glass of indecisiveness, to be
repeating itself.
Although it can be hoped that Congress will heed the call to legis-
lative action made in Nacirema, such an initiative appears unlikely at
the present time. Until the courts, acting as interpreters of congres-
sional intent, clearly extend the liberal remedies provided by the
Longshoretnen's Act beyond the pier's edge, the confusion of the past
forty years will continue.
